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Recent Decisions
Constitutional Law - Psychological Coercion Held To
Void Confessions Obtained By Long Questioning Of Un-
represented Mental Defective. Fikes v. State of Alabama,
352 U. S. 191 (1957). Defendant, a negro of very low men-
tality and of a highly suggestible nature, was apprehended
by private citizens in a white neighborhood during a rape
scare. He was turned over to the police who intermittently
questioned him at sessions of from two to three hours each,
though these sessions were spaced well apart. On some
days only one session was held while on other days there
were both morning and afternoon sessions. Two days after
his arrest, defendant was taken to the state prison and
placed in solitary confinement and held there incommuni-
cado, except for the questionings, until the confessions
were obtained. After four days there, defendant confessed
to burglary with intent to commit rape, his confession
being mostly in the form of yes and no answers to questions,
some of which were quite leading or suggestive. Five days
after the first confession was obtained, a second confession
was obtained in the same form. On the basis of these
two confessions, the defendant was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death, and the Supreme Court of Alabama
affirmed the decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
the United States reversed. Though there was no evidence
of physical brutality, in view of defendant's mental de-
ficiency, the circumstances preceding the confessions
amounted to psychological coercion, and therefore the use
of the confessions was a denial of due process.
Although not specifically referring to "psychological
coercion", the Maryland Court of Appeals in the case of
Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 29, 92 A. 2d 570 (1952), in
affirming the admission of a confession, said "the systematic
persistance of interrogation, the length of the periods of
questioning, the failure of the police to advise the prisoner
of his rights, the absence of counsel or friends, and the
character of the prisoner are circumstances that may be
considered by the trial court in determining whether the
accused was deprived of due process of law". (Italics
added.) See also Grammer v. State, 203 Md. 200, 218, 100
A. 2d 257 (1953), for a good statement of the general Mary-
land rule that a confession must be obtained without force,
coercion, or hope or promise held out as inducement.
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Constitutional Law - Use Tax Collected From Foreign
Corporation On Local Sales By Solicitors On Commission.
Topps Garment Corp. v. State, 212 Md. 23, 128 A. 2d 595
(1957). Appellant, an Indiana corporation having no place
of business in Maryland, sold its products to Maryland
purchasers through solicitors. The solicitor received an
order from a purchaser, retained the deposit on the pur-
chase price as his commission, and then sent the order, on
the appellant's order-blank, to the appellant who had the
option of accepting or rejecting it. If it was accepted, the
goods were mailed directly to the purchaser. The solicitors
were neither on the appellant's payroll nor under its super-
vision. In 1954, the Maryland Comptroller, under Md. Code
(1951), Article 81 [Sections 368(b) and (k), 369, and 371],
which imposes a duty on corporations engaged in doing
business in this state to collect a use tax, assessed the
appellant $3,065, which went unheeded. An attachment
was then issued against a Maryland creditor in which the
garnishee admitted a debt owing to the appellant. On
appeal from a judgment for the state and judgment of con-
demnation in favor of the state, the Court of Appeals
affirmed. Even though the solicitors were independent con-
tractors and not servants of the appellant, their activities
caused a stream of goods to flow into Maryland which
created such competition between the company, in whose
behalf they were acting, and Maryland merchants, that the
company must be considered equivalent to a local mer-
chant. A tax on such activities is not contrary to the "fair
and orderly" administration of the laws which is insured
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. The tax is also not void under
the Commerce Clause because the Commerce Clause does
not absolutely prevent the levying of state taxes which may
have some incidental effect on interstate commerce.
Although in Miller Bros. v. State of Md., 347 U. S. 340
(1954), noted 14 Md. L. Rev. 376 (1954), the Supreme Court
in a 5-4 decision overruling the Maryland Court of Appeals
said that the statute requiring a foreign merchant to col-
lect and remit a use tax to the state was contrary to due
process, the circumstances and the extent of corporate
activity was different from the present case. In that case,
the corporate activity in Maryland consisted only of adver-
tising in Delaware newspapers and on Delaware radio
stations which happened to reach Maryland residents, plus
an occasional circular sent to all its customers including
Maryland residents. This type of activity did not create an
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invasion of Maryland consumer markets and was not tax-
able. There is a wide gulf between this type of contact and
that of the foreign corporation in General Trading Co. v.
Tax Commission, 322 U. S. 335 (1944), cited as authority by
the Maryland court in the present case, where the Supreme
Court upheld the Iowa use tax on facts analogous to the
present case. To the same effect, see Thompson v. Rhodes-
Jennings Furniture Co. etc., 223 Ark. 705, 268 S. W. 2d 376
(1954), cert. den. 348 U. S. 872 (1954), discussed Summary
of October, 1953 Term, 74 S. Ct. 192, 194 (1954).
Criminal Law - Appeal Of Escaped Defendant Dis-
missed. Ramsey v. State, 212 Ga. 793,96 S. E. 2d 250 (1957).
Defendant was convicted of robbery and was granted a
new trial. At the second trial, defendant was convicted
again. His motion for a new trial was denied and he filed a
bill of exceptions. While the case was pending before the
Georgia Supreme Court, he escaped from jail and became
a fugitive from justice. A report of the escape was sent to
the court which issued an order giving defendant one
month to furnish evidence of his surrender or recapture.
This order was not complied with and the defendant having
made no response thereto so as to show submission to the
judgment, the court held that the writ must be dismissed.
In 24 C. J. S. 650-2, Criminal Law, Sec. 1825, it is pointed
out that an appeal may be dismissed if the fugitive does
not surrender himself within a time fixed by the court, and
this is the rule by statute in some states. In absence of
statute, it is not imperative for the appellate court to dis-
miss. In Harrelson v. State, 222 Miss. 514, 76 So. 2d 516
(1954), it was held that where defendant, pending his
appeal from a felony conviction, escaped from custody and
was still at large, the appeal would not be dismissed, but
the case would be remanded to the files to be brought up
again on proper motion if and when he was again in custody.
Criminal Law - Epileptic Driver Held Guilty Of Crimi-
nal Negligence. People v. Decina, 2 N. Y. 2d 133, 138 N. E.
2d 799 (1956). Defendant, knowing that he was subject to
epileptic attacks, was driving alone on a public street
when he had an attack. His automobile swerved onto the
sidewalk, killing four persons. He was charged with crimi-
nal negligence (N. Y. PENAL LAW, Sec. 1053-a) in the oper-
ation of an automobile. A demurrer to the indictment was
overruled and on appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
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affirmed. By operating an automobile on a public highway
with knowledge that, uncontrolled, it is a highly dangerous
instrumentality and with knowledge that he was subject
to epileptic attacks which might strike at any time, the
motorist made a conscious choice of action in disregard of
the consequences which he knew might ensue.
The Maryland statute, Md. Code (1951) Art. 27, Sec. 455,
makes it a misdemeanor to cause the death of another as
the result of operating a vehicle in a "grossly negligent
manner". The statute does not define gross negligence, but
Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, circa 588, 102 A. 2d 277 (1954),
discussing the interpretation of the section held that there
was carried over into the statute the common law concept
of gross negligence amounting to wanton or reckless dis-
regard for human life. See also State v. Gooze, 14 N. J.
Super. 277, 81 A. 2d 811 (1951), reaching the same result
as the principal case where the driver was suffering from
Meniere's Syndrome.
Eminent Domain - Evidence Of Reasonable Probability
Of Zoning Reclassification Admissible In Determining
Market Value. State Roads Commission v. Warriner, 211
Md. 480, 128 A. 2d 248 (1957). Defendants' land was taken
by the State Roads Commission under eminent domain,
and proceedings were brought to determine its fair market
value. Although the property was zoned for residential
use at the time of the taking, the defendants, over
objection, showed population growth, commercial expan-
sion, demands for industrial property, and the contiguity of
existing light industrial zones in the area, and introduced
expert testimony that the highest and best use of the con-
demned tract was for light industrial use. The jury was
permitted to consider this evidence as indicative of the
probability of reclassification of the property in the near
future and as bearing upon the fair market value. On
appeal from a determination based on this evidence, the
Court of Appeals affirmed. In determining the fair market
value of land taken by eminent domain proceedings the
jury may consider evidence of a reasonable probability that
zoning classification will be changed within a reasonable
time and the influence of such changes upon the market
value of the land taken. The evidence submitted supported
such a probability of change.
This is the first Maryland case recognizing such an ex-
ception to the general rule acknowledged in Bonaparte v.
M. & C. C. of Balto., 131 Md. 80, 101 A. 594 (1917), and
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Con. G. E. L. & P. Co. v. M. & C. C. of Balto., 130 Md. 20,
99 A. 968 (1917), that ordinarily only uses for which the
land is adapted and presently available may be considered.
Decisions in other states recognizing this exception indi-
cate, however, that it should be limited to cases where the
evidence of probable change in zoning is reasonably fore-
seeable and imminent enough actually to be reflected in
the market place. The cases are collected in 173 A. L. R. 265.
Insurance - Lack Of Notice Invalidates "Financial
Responsibility" Policy After Death Of Insured. Inland
Mutual Insurance Company v. Peterson, 148 F. Supp. 392
(D. C. Md., 1957). One Webb was convicted of drunken
driving and was required under the provision of Md. Code
(1951), Art. 66 , Sec. 116, to give and maintain proof of
his financial responsibility before a new license would be
issued to him. The policy, approved by the Department
of Motor Vehicles, contained the standard clause that if the
insured dies the policy shall, if written notice be given the
insurer within sixty days after such death, cover as an in-
sured the insured's legal representative and any person
having proper temporary custody of the automobile. Webb
died intestate leaving as next of kin his mother, the defen-
dant, who took charge of his automobile but failed to notify
the insurance company. Within the month, the automobile
was involved in an accident in which a third party was in-
jured. The insurance company refused to defend the re-
sulting suit and filed this action praying a judgment declar-
ing that it is not obligated to defend that suit nor to pay
any claims arising out of the accident. The District Court
held for the plaintiff insurer. Giving notice to the insurer
within sixty day after the death of the insured was clearly
a condition precedent to the continued liability of the in-
surer and is valid unless something in the Financial Re-
sponsibility Law precludes the operation of the provision.
While Art. 66 , Sec. 143, provides that all forms of proof
shall be released "when such proof is no longer required
by this Article", the certification of the policy was required
because the insured had been convicted of drunken driving,
not because the vehicle was a commercial vehicle; the pur-
pose here was to protect the public against Webb rather
than his automobile. There is nothing in the statute that
can be construed as requiring proof of financial responsi-
bility beyond the life time of a bad risk.
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Torts - Injured Fisherman May Rely On Res Ipsa
Loquitor And Is Not Barred By Assumption Of Risk.
Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So. 2d 49 (La., 1956). Plaintiff and
defendant were fishing, sitting back to back in a small boat.
In making an overhand cast, the defendant struck plaintiff
in the eye with his lure. Plaintiff did not see how the acci-
dent happened. He sued, relying on res ipsa loquitor, and
recovered medical expenses, but the trial court disallowed
damages on the ground that there was not sufficient evi-
dence of negligence. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of
Appeals amended the judgment to include damages, and as
amended, it was affirmed. Under the circumstances, when
one makes an overhead-forward cast, his lure would not be
expected to strike another person in the boat but for some
fault or negligence on the caster's part. Under such facts
there necessarily arises the presumption that the caster
was negligent from the happening of the accident itself -
res ipsa loquitor. Generally, a participant in a game or
sport can by participation assume all risks incidental to it
which are obvious and forseeable. But while one who be-
comes part of a fishing party may assume all ordinary and
normal hazards incident to the sport, he is not required to
assume all risks of negligence of other persons in the
party (p. 55).
On res ipsa loquitur generally, see articles by Thomsen,
3 Md. L. Rev. 285 (1939) and Farinholt, 10 Md. L. Rev.
337 (1949).
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